Since I've already explained it to you, your insistence implies you think you can either read minds or stubbornly refuse to accept any subsequent clarification. It's your personal problem if you refuse to accept what someone explicitly says they mean. So something that appears to be both red and green at the same time could really just be wholly red? And you can presume that without being able to isolate the appearance of red from that of green? That doesn't sound like a justified presumption. Complexity usually involves things composed of many much simpler or fundamental elements, not simple things composed of more complex elements. A red/green superposition is composed of only red? That's contradictory. So if an empirically indeterministic system (not just a naive appearance of complexity) is really deterministic, that would seem to be something unprecedented. That you can continue to just blithely claim it's really deterministic is begging the question. You have to allow for the possibility it is not to support an argument rather than just presume it. So the question begging is just presuming the "relevant domains"? Presuming which domains in which free will can exist/operate is no better than just presuming all domains deterministic. Domains are not devoid of interaction and cannot be so artificially isolated. But I think the real, non-begging question is whether free will can coexist with determinism, regardless of the domains of either. Can both determinism and free will exist, in any way? Compatibility presumes that one is, or can be, subordinate to the other in some sort of exclusionary way. Sorry, I meant incompatibilist. You can take that correction at face value or not. Starting with the premise of a wholly deterministic universe is literally begging the question, when the proposed question is whether or not free will exists. "Relevant domain" is even further begging the question. The first precludes domains that are not deterministic, while the second precludes that any non-deterministic domains be allowed. If you can't see how that is obviously begging the question, we're at an impasse, as you'll use your presumptions to dismiss any argument out of hand. I don't agree with your unjustified premise. The Copenhagen Interpretation, and many that accept wave-function collapse, are considered complete. "The wave function is a complete description of a wave/particle. Any information that cannot be derived from the wave function does not exist. For example, a wave is spread over a broad region, therefore does not have a specific location." - http://abyss.uoregon.edu/~js/21st_century_science/lectures/lec15.htmlThis directly addresses Einstein's complaint that "In a complete theory there is an element corresponding to each element of reality." Where he thought quantum momentum and location must both have reality, the Copenhagen Interpretations simply solves that by accepting the empirical evidence that they do not. So "there is an element corresponding to each element of reality", and complete according to Einstein's criteria, even though they disagree on what is real. Einstein assumes properties not available to empirical testing are real. Copenhagen-like interpretations accept the empirical indeterminism of QM as a full description of the underlying reality. Look it up for yourself. Quantum indeterminacy is an empirical fact, while assumptions of determinism are not. If you can't accept that, that's your problem. But take solace in the fact that you're in good company. Assuming determinism where only empirical indeterminism presents itself is anthropocentric. I know it's hard to fathom, but it's not telepathy. All the information we can receive "through our senses", via empirical experiment, from QM only points to indeterminism. Deterministic interpretations must do so by making empirically unjustified assumptions. Otherwise, you could show me evidence of QM determinism. "If randomness ... is assumed to be a product of insufficient perception" you've said it yourself. It's only an assumption. No one's argued an exception to anything but you begging the question by presuming determinism as a premise.